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Lilly: Bills and Notes--Serial Notes--Effect of Part Being Due
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
depositor. Seemingly, mutual obligations are balanced as of date
of insolvency.
In some cases where collateral has been given, the reciprocity
rule enunciated in the principal case has been applied to defeat a
set-off," it being said that to allow it would grant a preference. In
other cases,' the courts have failed to make any distinction between situations where collateral has been given and where it has
not. The United States Bankruptcy Law recognizes the right of
set-off in all cases of mutual debts and mutual credits.'
-MELVILL

BILLs AND NOTES-SER&L NOTES--EFFECT

STEWART.

OF PART BEING

DuE.-The defendant was the maker of a series of notes maturing
on successive dates. They arose out of one transaction and were
given for one consideration. The court assumed that such fact
was inferable from the face of the notes. They did not contain acceleration provisions. The plaintiff purchased all the notes after
the first was overdue. Held, under statute,' that the plaintiff took
all the notes with notice that they had been dishonored and the defense was good as to all the notes. Beasley Hardware Company v.
Stevens.2
On the question involved in the principal case there is a conflict of authority.8 Several recent cases,' including Morgan v.
7Prudential Realty Company v. Allen, 241 Mass. 277, 135 N. E. 221, 25 A.
L. R. 935 (1922). Contra: Salladin v. Mitchell, 42 Neb. 859, 61 N. W. 127
(1894).
8
Supra, n. 4.
9 § 68a-' IIn all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate
of a bankrupt and a creditor, the account shall be stated and one debt shall
be set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid."
See 2 CoLIER, BANXRUPTCY (13th ed. 1923) 1612.

' GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 4294.

2155 S. E. 67 (Ga. 1930); Case Comment (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 464.
8
Harrington v. Claflin & Company, 91 Tex. 294, 42 S. W. 1055 (1897);
Ferguson v. Wiede, 46 S. W. 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898); Iowa City Bank v.
Friar, 167 S. W. 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); National State Bank v. Ricketts,
177 S. W. 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Huselby v. Allison, 25 S. W.
(2d) 1108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Rowe v. Scott, 28 S. Dak. 145, 132 N. W.
695 (1911).
Contra: Boss v. Hewitt, 15 Wis. 285 (1862); Patterson v.
Wright, 64 Wis. 289 (1885); Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Company,
97 W. Va. 83, 124 S. E. 591 (1924); Cable Company v. Bruce, 135 Okla. 170,
274 Pac. 665 (1928); Mountjoy Parts Company v. Bank, 12 S. W. (2d) 609,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Farmington CoaZ & Coke Company' have reached a different re-

sult in this situation. Under the NEGOTiABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW
our Supreme Court of Appeals holds! that the fact that one of a
series of notes, which have arisen out of one transaction, is unpaid,
does not of itself constitute actual knowledge of a defect or infirmity in the balance of the notes to a purchaser, nor, in the
absence of further facts or circumstances indicating that the maker
has or would have refused payment, make the taking one in bad
faith. The West Virginia Court said! in effect that a purchaser
could as reasonably think the default was due to temporary financial embarrassment of the maker as well as to defects or infirmities
in the notes. The principal case and decisions in accord therewith may be explained,' perhaps, as a failure to distinguish the
rule of "constructive notice" properly applicable to ordinary
property transfers from the more exacting standard of "bad

faith' '' established by the NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW."
Frequently acceleration provisions are found in serial notes.
If the acceleration provisions are construed to give the holder no
option," but the notes are treated as matured on default in payment of one, it is clear that a purchaser knowing one note was
overdue, should be considered a holder after maturity and subject to defences as to all the notes." A troublesome case would
arise where the purchaser knew of the existence of the overdue
note, but did not know of the default in its payment, and purchased
only the balance of the notes. As to the transferor all the notes
would be matured, but on analogy to the protection given to the
innocent purchaser of a bill dishonored by non-acceptance, the
purchaser should be allowed to rely on the stated maturity dates."
A somewhat different question would be presented if the acCable Company v. Bruce, supra n. 3; Mountjoy Parts Company v. Bank,
supra n. 3.
5
rSupra n. 3.
aW. VA. CODE AxN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 98, § 52; W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)
c. 46, art. 4, § 2.
7Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Company, supra n. 3.
8Ibid. at 599, 601.
0 Suggested in Cable Company v. Bruce, supra n. 3.
"Cain v. Cox, 23 W. Va. 594 (1884) ; Fishcher v. Lee, 98 Va. 163, 35 S. E.

441 (1900).

n Rightmire, Bad Faith in Negotiable Paper (1920) 18 MicH. L. REv. 355.
"NEGOTnBLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, § 56.
"Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev.
747, 764.
" Stoy v. Bledsoe, 31 Ind. App. 643, 68 N. E. 907 (1903).
1Chafee, loo. cit. supra n. 13, at 765.
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celeration provisions were construed to give the holder an option"
to declare the maturity of all the notes. Let us suppose after default in the payment of one note, the holder transferred all the
notes to a purchaser, who, as in the other cases herein discussed,
knew of the default, but had no actual knowledge of a defect or
infirmity in the notes. Quaere: Should the purchaser be treated
as a holder in due course as to the balance of the notes? This
action by the transferor would indicate an election not to insist
on his cause of action, but to sell thie notes. But could not the
purchaser still reasonably think such election was caused by the
inability of the maker to pay, rendering immediate suit useless, as
well as by the existence of a defect or infirmity in the notes? It is
submitted that the question raised differs so slightly from the one
presented in Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Company" that
under the NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW' it should be treated the
same.
-DAvID G. LILLY, JR.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-LEGISLATIVE

REGULATION

OF

FEES

CHARGED BY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES.-A federal court has recently

held a Missouri statute fixing the maximum registration fee that
employment agencies may charge for their services to be void and
The court reasons
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.'
that it is bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Ribnik v. McBride,' in which the Court split, six to
three, on legislation also construed to fix fees charged by employYet the intimation
ment agencies and held the statute invalid.'
of the court in Bradford v. Hargis is sympathetic to the dissenting
view of Ribnik v. McBride.
The need for employment agency regulations seems apparent.
Many state statutes have attempted it to various extents.'
26 Ibid. 767.
17Supra n. 3.
' NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, § 56.

"Bradford v. Hargis, 45 F(2d) 223 (D. C., W. D. Mo. 1931).
2 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545 (1927).
3 The majority of the Court, composed of Chief Justice Taft and Justices
Sanford, Sutherland, MeReynolds, VanDevanter and Butler, decided the
statute in question was void. The dissenters were Justices Brandeis, Holmes
and Stone.
I See Hamilton, The Regulation of Employment Agencies (1930) 38 YALE
L. J. 225, 229. Also see, Statistics of Unemployment and the Work of the
Employment Offices (U. S. Bureau of Labor 1913) Bull. No. 109, 35-36.
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